The roots of the immigration crisis

Mexico and the United States have had a contentious relationship over the centuries, but today this relationship is incredibly strained despite the great interdependence each nation shares with the other. The context for this strain lies is the great border migration from Mexico into the Southwestern states. This migration is at times legal, but mostly is illegal, and here the problem begins. The problem of illegal immigration is compounded by the racism of the American people on the border who see (wrongly) employment opportunities vaporizing with the influx of non-native Americans and (partially correctly) their tax dollars going to the upkeep of an illegal population. The illegal immigration problem is the result of international policies of globalization that have had the effect of destroying the social programs and safety nets that stabilized and subsidized the population of the Mexican people.

The project of development for the Third World pursued by the First World, primarily the United States, had a great and profound affect on Mexico. This process of industrialization of undeveloped nations and their subsequent integration into the global economy was a continuation, in a fashion, of the colonialist policies of the pre-World War II. Because of the empire draining effects of that war, and because of the spreading of Western concepts of democracy, revolution, and individual freedom, the old repressive tactics of the traditional empire would not suffice to control the resources and labor of the global underclass. A new direction was needed for the First World, the global elite, as it were, if we take into account the population levels of the First World in comparison with their global consumption. This new direction required a delicate dance between on the one hand promoting a philosophy of individualist economic libertarianism aimed at subjugation elimination and freedom and on the other protecting First World rights and power over the resources and labor of the Third World. Thus, developmentalist policies came to be seen as not only the newer version of the “White Man’s Burden”, but also as the barometer up against which a nation’s fortunes were measured.

Mexico, being the United States’ neighbor to the south, came to the table of developmentalist negotiations in a unique position. There were two antithetical aspects to this position. For one, Mexico had the advantage on the table of providing the United States and its transnational corporations with labor at a rate cheaper than could be exploited domestically without having to ship capital and resources across far distances with the risks inherent in doing so. Also, the neighbor to the north, Canada, was a far more difficult partner for industry’s bottom line, having, as it did and does, a higher cost of living and unionized labor force. In this regard, Mexico had an advantage. But this advantage was tempered by Mexico’s dependence on the United States for loans and cross-border economic interactivity. This dependence relied on the US’s singular place in the Western Hemisphere as economic and military hegemonic superpower. While Mexico had an advantage at the bargaining table in regards to what it could offer, the US held the power position by virtue of what it could withhold. It is no surprise, then, that Mexico adopted the policies “suggested” by its neighbor to the north.

Among the policies instituted in the name of development in Mexico was the Mexican Border Industrialization Program, or BIP. Intrinsically tied to the growing decentralization of the global production system and world labor force, the BIP “paralleled this ‘decentralization’.. whereby unfinished components would come to the new industrial enclave for assembly to be sold on the world market as a world product. In 1965, the Mexican government implemented the BIP to allow entirely foreign-owned corporations to establish labor-intensive assembly plants within a 12 mile strip south of the border” (Development and Social Change, Philip McMichael, p.81). Thus began the cross-border economic relationship which would, as times became dire for the Mexican people, become the familiar starting point for those who dreamed of a better life in the north. The BIP provided exactly what Mexico had promised, furnishing US based transnational mega-corporations with cheaply manufactured products ready for assembly or sale in the US market within 12 miles of the border. Even today, as the US and Japan are increasingly moving their car factories to just over the Mexican border for US consumption, the BIP has had a lasting influence on the economic reality in which both the people of Mexico and the United States live.

With developmental policy came crushing debt. This debt had its origination in the currency devaluation and the deregulation of financial institutions in the 1970s. President Richard Nixon, in 1971, declared the dollar no longer tied to gold as a last resort for its value, having the effect of international currency floating in relative value to one another. International currency trading exploded, creating an industry of numerology whose total annual income was almost twice that of real production. With this sudden explosion of wealth, and the resulting currency instability that was a logical outcome of the policy, transnational corporations and financial institutions had little choice but to “diversify their global operations to reduce their risk” (McMichael, p. 125–126). This had the consequence of low interest loans ad infinitum to Third World countries, which in turn led those nation’s leaders to take advantage of what was essentially free money. Although much of this money was recycled into the economy by way of public works projects with an eye to keeping a pacified public in the face of sometimes brutal and corrupt regimes and usually exploitative international economic practices of domestic production for export, some- and sometimes most- was inevitably lost to corrupt state officials and graft. Whatever the end result of the loan, the financial institutions were only too happy to loan and the Third World was only too happy to accept. “Too much money”, as McMichaels says on page 126, “was lent on the assumption that countries could not go bankrupt”. Once countries had problems repaying due to a myriad of issues, including but not limited to currency devaluation, they had no choice but to continue to take out loans simply to service the debt on the previous loans. It’s easy to see how this course of action could lead to bankruptcy, which inevitably occurred, leading to a global debt crises, the solution of which were crushing austerity measures.

Debt management was a process by which the First World simultaneously disposed of the developmentalist mentality of its dealings with the Third World and ushered in the beginning of globalization. The Third World was in a bind. Constrained on the one hand by crushing debt, and on the other by the conditions of debt relief prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF, both instruments of the interests of the First World, the nations of the Third World found themselves in a bind. They had no choice but to accept the debt relief, despite the conditions set. These conditions were draconian austerity measures that aimed at the destruction of social programs for the poor and privatization of public resources- privatization that came from the First World more than from domestic industry. With these cuts in social spending came the inevitable consequences of food shortages, increased poverty and unrest. “The debt managers [of the IMF and the World Bank] placed the blame [for the debt crisis] on the policies of the debtor countries rather than on the organization of the global financial system”, which had, of course, caused the crisis to be far worse than it otherwise may have been by continual low interest loans (McMichael, p.132). The only recourse for the debtor nations against these nation-destroying policies aiming at the profitability of the First World was a collective debtor’s strike, which was seen as unlikely to work by the individual nations as they would have to rely on their fellows to implement the same strike measures, a risk many were hesitant to take.

Mexico was one of the first countries to collapse under the weight of its debt and thus became a testing ground for the measures the First World would tie their loans to. By 1982, Mexico had a national debt of $80 billion. The IMF agreed to service the debt, but only if Mexico would undertake to implement certain austerity measures, including, but not limited to, elimination of food subsidies, reduction of social health services and reduction of wages. Mexico’s outgoing President Portillo railed against the IMF but was forced to reverse himself due to political pressure from the incoming President Miguel de Madrid, and the austerity measures proceeded as planned. The measures were a horror for the Mexican people. “The number of Mexicans in poverty rose from 32.1 to 41.3 million, matching the absolute increase in population size during 1983–1987 (emphasis added)… manufacturing growth rates plummeted…By 1986, Mexico was exporting to the United States more than $2 billion worth of fresh fruits, vegetables and beef, but also importing from that country $1.5 billion in farm product, largely basic grains and oil seeds. IMF structures made dependency on staple foods more expensive and reduced the government’s role in subsidizing food staples” (McMichael, p. 135). Mexico had gone from being a poor but relatively social secure country to a poverty-striken wasteland of industry within less than half a generation.

Is it any wonder, then, that in a situation in which abject poverty had become an industrialized reality within a handful of years that destitute Mexicans would look northward for salvation and the survival of their families? When else in history have an oppressed and subjugated people not taken advantage of their proximity to their oppressor? While one can make the argument that the economic imperialism of the First World is not a perfect parallel to the imperialism of the colonial powers of yesteryear, the fact remains that the policies implemented by the Mexican government at the behest of the First World, and, due to proximity and the fact of the 50 percent exposure of US based banks in Mexico, specifically at the behest of the United States constitute an imperialism of economy. And while this essay has declined to tackle the subject head on, the dawn of NAFTA brought about not only capital flight from the United States to Mexico for the cheap labor available, but also brought about a massive decline in the value of the peso resulting from currency speculation and overvaluation. Even before NAFTA the seeds were there for massive migration northward from Mexico, and these seeds were not because of Mexico’s policies or the character of the Mexican people. The true reason for the great illegal immigration of the Mexican people to the United States is the misguided policy of developmentalism that has been pursued with an eye towards First World profit at the expense of Third World humanity.